This is a paper that I wrote for an honors social studies class (taught by Dr. Ralph Hood) during my undergraduate studies at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. We were asked to write our thoughts on how best to define “religion”. 

Religion, as I define it, is composed of two parts: a grouping or set of philosophical viewpoints concerning the supernatural ‑ which are based upon inductive reasoning ‑ and the ethical implications that may be derived thereof The doctrine of a religion necessarily pertains to man’s search for fundamental absolutes.

Since, arguably, it is impossible for us to perceive an absolute as such, we must ultimately base all beliefs and actions upon inductive rather than deductive reasoning. Logically, our degree of willingness to accept an inferred conclusion or paradigm is directly proportional to the amount of consistency found between previous phenomena and the paradigm. For instance, each morning in the past humans may have affirmed that the sun has appeared in the eastern sky at a given time. But this does not preclude the possibility that tomorrow’s morning sky may be completely dark.

Although it seems foolish to call it inference when you say that the sun will come up tomorrow morning, the same principle is at work when you express reluctance to volunteer for the testing of a new pharmaceutical. You believe that the sun will be up when your alarm clock goes off at 11:30 a.m. because that has been the case with every previous day, but you are unwilling to try out a new drug because no one really knows what it will do to you. In both instances, your conclusions are based upon inference ‑ not fact. Tomorrow the laws of physics, as we know them, may have gone the way of the leisure suit, and everything that we thought we knew may be disproved.

As stated previously, a religion is formed when a person chooses to form a paradigm or structured set of commonly held inferences pertaining to that which is superior to and cannot be directly perceived by the human senses, and dictates their actions accordingly. Within religion I distinguish two main branches: naturalism and supernaturalism or theism. The myriad supernaturalistic religions (including Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, pantheism, etc … ) are usually the ones given the label “religion”. I choose to place naturalism under the heading of religion because it deals with the same question as supernaturalism, but answers it differently. The question is: “Is there existence superior to or independent of the laws of nature?”. Obviously, naturalism answers this in the negative. But this reply is not without ethical repercussions of its own. This is the second way in which naturalism fits with the definition of religion that I have chosen. The concepts of human responsibility and morality are approached very differently by one who denies the existence of anything more than the physical universe and the laws by which it operates.

If the term spirituality is to be understood as the quality of possessing an incorporeal nature that is distinct from one’s physical nature, then I would place such a concept under supernaturalistic religion. I certainly do not view it as a term synonymous with or equivalent to religion. It is but one of many possible elements within any given religious doctrine ‑ albeit an often significant one.

By the definition of religion that I have presented, it would seem that the field of science would fall into the category of religion. However, this is not the case if, by strict definition, science does not pertain to absolutes and is limited exclusively to things that may be deduced within its own paradigm. In other words, science does not attempt to affirm or deny the existence of something superior to nature, or claim the ability to do so. Neither does it present any form of ethics, since it merely states what is ‑ not what ought to be. To claim that the practice of scientific method is religious, would be equivalent to calling someone an artist simply because they manufacture watercolor paints.

The scientist, however, may indeed derive ethical conclusions in his interpretation of natural phenomena. In doing so, he places himself in the religious category of naturalism. In fact, I would propose that all humans have some form of religion ‑ since we all have some opinion about the supernatural, and most of our conscious actions are at least partially a function of this. In order to be completely free of any religious beliefs, one would have to be able to successfully avoid thinking or forming any opinion about the supernatural. I am disinclined to accept that this is possible.

Just as in the cases of reductionists like Sigmund Freud or Karl Marx, my approach to the social sciences is unquestionably and unavoidably colored by my personal religious beliefs. Based on their denial of supernaturality, they sought for reasons to explain why people would chose to create supernaturalistic religions. Their implicit assumption is that this choice is delusional. I accept supernaturalism, theism, monotheism, and most specifically, Christianity. Operating within this paradigm, I hold that people adopt supernaturalistic religions because of an innate desire to understand and connect to God. Therefore, the social sciences are useful to me insofar as they help to reveal why people choose to adopt one religion over another.

I further maintain that the practice of the scientific reasoning or logic is not antithetical to the doctrines of Christianity. I believe that any elements of the doctrine which seem to contradict natural laws or physical evidence simply reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of either the laws or the phenomena. Moreover, it seems illogical to expect the supernatural to be necessarily obedient to the laws of the natural, especially if the latter operates as a function of the former.

Of all of the ways that modern thinking has been shaped by the social sciences, I think that probably the most valuable principle to be found therein was that of the term illusion as defined by Freud ‑ specifically, the acceptance of a belief due to one’s desire to believe it, independent of its actual veracity. Unlike delusion, the evaluation of an illusion does not carry any value connotations. In a world in which it is increasing questionable to evaluate ideas through reference to absolutes, the addition of this word to our vocabulary has had an ever‑growing impact on the way we approach the multiform nature of society.

Freud certainly does not deserve all of the credit for the formulation of this concept. He was a product of his times, and I think that it was bound to develop out of the growing optimism and confidence in science as a panacea. My personal opinion is that Freud’s implicit trust in the scientific method was itself illusory. He contradicts his own terminology in The Future of an Illusion, when he says that religion is an illusion that society no longer requires, and from which it needs to be freed ‑ implying that the basic premise of all supernaturalistic religions is incorrect. I think that although he is unwilling to state it openly, he actually sees religion as a delusion. This exhibits rather unscientific thinking on his part.

Reacting against this shortsighted tacit condemnation of religion, later sociologists ‑ such as Mircea Eliade, E.E. Evans‑Pritchard, and Clifford Geertz ‑ attempt to formulate completely value‑free accounts of the characteristics of religion as it is found in various cultures, examining the motives behind each doctrine without condemning or advocating any one in particular. Evans‑Pritchard and Geertz are especially emphatic in their denial of modem science’s ability to distinguish one approach as superior to another. They insist that a religion can only ever be truly understood or evaluated within its own paradigm.

While I find this kind of devotion to scientific objectivity to be noble and valuable, I also think that they are illuded in the same way as Freud. They make the specious claim that it is possible, through a careful conscious effort, to prevent one’s own religious paradigm from influencing the comprehension of another. I find it difficult to accept this assertion, since my mind seems unable to avoid approaching new or foreign concepts without making reference and comparison to previously established ones.

I think that the most logical approach to social science ‑ as with any science ‑ is to recognize those elements that cause the margin of error. In doing so, one is much more capable of resisting these tendencies and of giving a more accurate representation or interpretation of the phenomena.

In conclusion, I do not accept the now commonly held notion of moral relativity. I simply deny that moral guidelines can be derived from logic, reason, or the application of the scientific method. I am persuaded that the source of these prescriptions is supernatural and super‑logical. If such a source does not exist on a supernatural level, then it seems foolish to try to find it within the paradigm of science. The most logical ethical conclusion in such a scenario would be to abandon the further advocation or implementation of morality.

From within my personal religious paradigm, the social sciences are useful insofar as they are a continual source of data, which I utilize to evaluate the internal consistency of my paradigm. The two things which I hold to be most vital in my attempt to formulate a belief system are: the search for internal consistency within a paradigm, and the endeavor to identify and eliminate elements of the paradigm that are based upon illusions. Since I accept the laws of logic and the scientific method as elements of my religious paradigm, the nature of the entire structure is affected by the degree of consistency found between new data and established doctrines. The information provided by the social sciences is just as useful in this as that from any other branch of science.